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Abstract: 
 
Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational 
choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding identity. On the one hand, externalist 
rational choice ignores the concept of identity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other 
hand, internalist  rational choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social  action, 
because  it  permits  expressive  motivations  to  be  included  in  the  models.  However,  internalist 
theorists tend to reduce identity to desire -the desire of a person to express her social being. From an 
internalist point of view, that is, from a viewpoint in which not only desires but also beliefs play a 
key role in social explanations as mental entities, this paper rejects externalist reductionism and 
proposes a redefinition of social identity as a net of beliefs about oneself, beliefs that are indexical, 
robust and socially shaped.
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1. Introduction 
 
The  theory  of  rational  choice  can  be  interpreted  from two  epistemological  approaches:  an 
internalist one and an externalist one. According to the first, the agent’s preferences and beliefs are 
mental states that constitute reasons for action; while the second solely considers the preferences 
revealed in the action and certain behavioral hypothesis, neither of which entails delving into the 
minds  of  individuals.  Although  both  approaches  are  neutral  with  respect  to  formal  models  of 
rational  choice,  they  diverge  when  the  paradigm is  expanded  to  incorporate  motives  that  are 
expressive of or derived from the identities of individuals. In this paper, we argue that the internalist 
conception of rational choice is the only interpretation that can be extended to include  identity-
based preferences or desires. However, this proves to be insufficient, since at the same time we hold 
that people’s social identity has less to do with preferences or desires than with their beliefs about 
themselves  and  the  world.  These  beliefs  can  be  distributed  into  practical  syllogisms  whose 
conclusions are reasons for action in the form of desires to act or obligations to act.  In the last part 
of this  paper we explore the nature of identity beliefs,  that  is,  their  indexation,  robustness and 
emotional dimension, among other properties, with a view to demonstrating the difficulties involved 
in incorporating all of these complex dimensions in the paradigm of rational choice, even when the 
model is interpreted from an internalist approach. Furthermore, given the essentially linguistic and 
cultural nature of practical identity syllogisms, we underscore in the conclusions the importance of 
analyzing language to understand this aspect of human behavior that appears to respond to what 
individuals claim to be. 
      
2. Two approaches to rational choice: internalist  and externalist 
 
            The so-called canonical paradigm of rational choice theory (Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, 1988: 
18)  explains  all  social  action  in  terms  of  the  decisions  made  by an  individual  or  a  group  of 
individuals in a given context, the consequences of those decisions and an assumption about the 
individual’s reasons for having made the decision, namely that individuals will try to maximize 
their benefits (whatever that benefit may be).  For a choice to be made, the agent must face a set of 
possible options (her feasible set). It is assumed that given her feasible set, the agent will choose the 
option that leads to – or she believes leads to- the best outcome. If she has full information about the 
outcome of her decisions, she will find herself in a situation of certainty and be able to maximize 
her  utility.  If  the  information  is  incomplete,  however,  she  will  only  be  able  to  maximize  the 
expected utility in a context of risk and uncertainty. In this situation she will attribute an objective 
or subjective probability to the outcome of her action. This probability is the belief she has about 
the results of her action.  
            
            Formal decision theory holds that if a person chooses X instead of Y, she prefers X to Y, but 
it  does not consider the nature of individual preferences, nor why people prefer some things to 
others.  From a formal  perspective,  the  only thing  that  matters  is  that  these  preferences  satisfy 
certain  basic  criteria  of  logical  consistency,  particularly  transitivity  and  completeness.  If  these 
requisites are violated, it  will be impossible to know what the person prefers;  their preferences 
cannot be ranked or ordered, and the decision theory will assume that the person did not choose 
rationally. 
 
This formal foundation of rational choice theory gives rise to two distinct interpretations 
regarding the behavior of individuals: one which is internal to the individual and another which is 
external. The internalist interpretation of rational choice holds that the theory describes “what is 
actually going on inside us when we reason” (Satz and Ferejohn, 1994: 73). But this internalist 
approach  also  assumes  that  mental  entities  –  the  desires  and  beliefs  upon  which  individual 
preferences are based – are causally linked to the individual’s  decision given that they provide 
reasons for action: beliefs and desires  are mental states that motivate the individual and causally 
explain  her  action  (Williams,  1981;  Boudon,  2003;  Landa,  2004;  Hedström,  2005,  2006).  If  a 
person chooses X instead of Y it is because she believes that X best satisfies her desires. These 
internal beliefs and desires, which are subjective, prompt her action.[1] 
 
From the internalist perspective, rational choice theory is both explanatory and normative at 
the same time (Hausman, 2001: 320, Landa, 2004). By relying on individual beliefs, desires and 
preferences and the role they play as reasons for action, the theory not only explains individual 
behavior  –  why individuals  choose  as  they do-  but  justifies  these  decisions  from a  normative 
standpoint in so far as they are the best ones that an individual can make in order to maximize her 
interest,  provided,  of  course,  that  she  has  sufficient  information  and  is  not  deceiving  herself 
(Davidson, 1980: 21; Elster, 1989: 25). Nevertheless, this conception would prove to be inconsistent 
if it were not founded on an explicit psychological realism regarding the mental entities or states 
that constitute the basic pieces of any explanation in terms of rational choice (Hausman, 1995: 100). 
For the internalist, “beliefs”, “desires” and “preferences” are not mere labels, nor simple theoretical 
constructions that aid us to understand human conduct or constructs that have no real correlation to 
what is going on in our minds, but are instead real events in the intentional processes of the human 
mind.  As  Boudon  formulates  it:  “any action  is  caused  by  reasons  in the  mind  of  individuals 
(rationality)” (Boudon, 2003: 3, emphasis added). Preferences, desires and beliefs thus form the 
building blocks of folk psychology defended by internalism. Given that these preferences can be 
ranked  and  represented  as  utility  functions,  the  internalist  interpretation  of  rational  choice 
mathematically transforms this folk psychology into a theory of utility maximization (Hausman, 
2000: 114).
 
The  externalist,  on  the  other  hand,  categorically  rejects  each  of  these  psychological 
assumptions.  The  externalist  interpretation  of  rational  choice  theory  rests  on  an  instrumental 
conception of the basic terms of the theory since it considers that the external, observable conduct 
of individuals is the only thing that can be taken into account. What goes on inside of each of our 
heads is of no interest to the social scientist, it is a black box that needn’t be opened in order to 
obtain genuine explanations (Börgers, 1996). “Beliefs” and “preferences” (which are not desires) 
are  mere  labels  that  we  use  to  describe  individual  action,  but  they  are  not  real  mental 
representations, or even if they are, they add nothing to the explanation: “...reference to preferences 
as representations of something `inside the head´...is not necessary” (Dowding, 2007: 12, see also 
Satz and Ferejohn, 1994: 76). In order to explain individual action it is therefore unnecessary to 
account for the individual’s reasons for action. If a person chooses X instead of Y, we say that she 
“prefers” X to Y where that preference is  revealed by the individual when deciding about a mere 
binary relation (Samuelson, 1948; Sen, 1971). Beliefs are interpreted as mere probabilities that a 
decision will lead to certain outcomes rather than others. Thus, given a person’s preferences and 
beliefs, it is assumed that she will act as if she is maximizing her interest (Friedman, 1986; Hardin, 
1982). The externalist conception, then, denies that rational choice theory is a normative theory. 
According to the externalists, it is simply a descriptive theory that explains actions instrumentally, 
but does not rely on mental representations or the internal reasons for action. Reasons are always 
external; the researcher attributes or assigns them to the individual and they are determined by the 
underlying parameters of the social structure – the market, the family, the political party,  social 
norms, the State, etc. – in which the individual interacts with others (Satz and Ferejohn, 1994: 77). 
 
While the formal component of rational choice theory is the same for both externalists and 
internalists, it is the interpretation of that component that differs. For the internalists, beliefs, desires 
and preferences are actual mental entities having motivational force, whereas for the externalists, 
they are little more than instrumental concepts that describe external conduct, i.e.,  the observable 
behavior  influenced  by  contextual  variables.  However,  these  two  divergent  interpretations  of 
rational  choice theory does not  always achieve different results:  this  divergence in  the theory’s 
foundations needn’t influence the models or the outcome of research. But this is not always so. In 
contrast to what is often said in other spheres of sociological theory about the problem of social  
identity,  rational  choice  theorists  do  not  share  the  same view.  Indeed,  in  this  case  a  divergent 
interpretation  of  the  theory’s  foundations  also  leads  to  a  different  position  with  regard  to  the 
possibility of including identity in the models. As we will see below, externalists and internalists 
approach the question of identity in different ways.  While the former deny its  utility,  the latter 
attempt to include it in their models. 
 
3. Rational choice and social identity 
 
            Before turning to the question of how the internalist and the externalist interpretations of 
rational  choice  deal  with  social  identity,  let  us  take  a  moment  to  explore  the  very concept  of 
identity, as it is sufficiently ambiguous to merit a definition. 
 
3.1. An initial instrumental approach to social identity 
 
The literature on social identity is so vast that one might be tempted to believe that it is 
founded upon a perfectly well-defined concept that is widely accepted among researchers. Yet this 
is not so and in many cases social identity is not only vague, ambiguous and enigmatic (Fearon, 
1999: 1), but is made to do a great deal of work (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 8; MacInnes, 2004). 
The concept of identity has been employed to analyze non-instrumental, expressive modes of action 
that assumedly aid us in understanding participation in social movements (Melucci, 1994). It has 
been used in turn to explain the fragmented nature of the contemporary self (Giddens, 1991) and to 
reject that the contemporary self is fragmented (Rinken, 2000). Identity has been interpreted as a 
fuzzy set of roles (Montgomery, 2000), as a source of individual security and stability (Woodward, 
2003)  and as  a  process  of  self-categorization  that  creates  meaningful  group boundaries  which, 
depending on the context, may exacerbate the contrast with other groups through stereotyping and 
prejudice (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 1987). And these are but a few of the examples chosen at random. 
 
  In spite of its enormous heterogeneity, social identity can be defined as “(a) a social category, 
defined by membership rules and allegedly characteristic attributes or expected behaviors or (b) a 
socially distinguishing feature that a person takes special pride in or views as unchangeable but 
socially consequential” or both things at the same time (Fearon, 1999: 36).[2] As a social category 
and a socially distinguishing feature, identity is, as well, a process of self-categorization and self-
understanding (Turner et al., 1987); of identifying with others and of commonality, connectedness 
and groupness (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 14-21). These are processes which permit the members 
of a group or collective to mutually recognize each other as such and define their social self (that is, 
to respond to the questions “Who am I?” and “Who are we?”) (Stryker, 1980: 385; Callero, 1985: 
205; Gusfield, Johnston and Laraña, 1994; Calvert, 2000). This process of self-categorization and 
mutual recognition, which is a social-cognitive process, shapes the perceptions and motivations of 
individuals and can result in increased intragroup cooperation[3] and/or intergroup conflict. For 
example, pride at belonging to a club – or any other identity group – may prompt us to defend our 
club against other clubs or groups even when this involves a personal cost to ourselves (Dawes et  
al. 1988, 1990). Likewise, prejudice towards another group may lead us to confront it when it 
would be more rational and beneficial to cooperate. It is generally thought that identity is a 
motivational factor that explains actions focused inwards to the group – usually cooperative action – 
and outwards – which tends to be conflictive.  Rational choice theory has no difficulties in 
explaining conflict –in terms of a conflict of interests– but given the theory’s fundamental 
assumption of self-interest, it encounters serious problems for explaining cooperation, and in 
general, any behavior that does not wed with the selfish dictates of private utility maximization. 
From the behavior of the median voter to the selfless and self-sacrificing revolutionary activist, 
from individual action undertaken in the name of social class or race to the action that puts group 
welfare before individual welfare, there is a whole rainbow of behaviors that standard rational 
choice theory would claim to be incomprehensible due to their irrationality and hence exclude them 
from the explanatory sphere. 
 
In contrast, identity theories assumes that individual or collective social action is governed by 
“particularistic self-understandings [of a non-instrumental nature] rather than by putatively 
universal self-interest” (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 6; Cohen, 1985) and can therefore move social 
agents to perform actions that transcend their own interests and that are inexplicable from the 
standpoint of orthodox rational choice. Thus it seems that identity provides an interesting heuristic 
tool that can serve to bridge certain explanatory gaps in the rational choice paradigm, which is 
otherwise very powerful. For this reason, in what follows we explore the question of whether and 
how it is possible to unify the two approaches to social action, or to put it another way, if it is 
possible, and how, for rational choice theory to incorporate (some of) the assumptions of identity 
theories.  However, as we stated above, this will depend on whether rational choice theory is 
interpreted from an internalist or an externalist approach.
 
3.2.External reasons, rational choice and identity 
 
The externalist conception of rational choice has sound arguments for rejecting both the criticisms 
of identity theorists as well as the use of the concept of identity. Yet as we will see in the following 
section their arguments are not conclusive. The rejection of identity theories stems from the fact that 
the causal relationship between identity and action is an obscure one, and on many occasions, 
identity theorists accept the theory as fact rather than providing evidence for it, attributing an 
explanatory power to identity which it lacks, unless it is made explicit (McInnes, 2004: 533; De 
Francisco and Aguiar, 2005: 13). For this reason, externalists often view explanations for social 
action in terms of supposed gender, ethnic or class identities as being little more than just another 
way of saying that individuals share interests and preferences with the members of a group (Hardin, 
1995: 10; Laitin, 1998).[4] From the viewpoint of external reasons, it is held that the theories of 
social identity needlessly multiple the reasons for action. The externalist would say that identity 
must rely on the individual’s internal processes, on what the social agent states that she is together 
with others, on her way of understanding herself, on the image that she has of herself, that is, on 
reasons for action that are only accessible to the social agent herself. The social scientist –the 
externalist would add- lacks this privileged access and can only rely on the observable behavior of 
individuals embedded in the core of social structures. But unlike preferences, identity is not 
revealed in the action; it has to be overtly expressed. For the externalist, however, resorting to 
verbal affirmations about what individuals say they are involves making post hoc justifications 
about the social action, justifications that do not explain it. That the social scientist attributes an 
identity to an individual is not justified either if we accept that the only thing we have to rely on is 
the action of individuals or their aggregate effects.[5] 
 If the identity were  revealed in the action, it could be reduced to mere preferences (revealed) 
about possible options: to join or not to join a cause; to go or not to go on strike; to demonstrate or 
not  to  demonstrate.  As an essentialist  and internalist  concept  of  identity it  adds  nothing to  the 
explanation of these social events, it  is enough to analyze the revealed preferences. Those who 
claim, for example, that a female worker takes part in a strike because of her class identity do not 
explain anything as they are resorting to an obscure internal entity of the individual – the identity or 
the conscience- without an apparent causal force on the action.  If a person or a group of people 
declare  that  they take part  in a collective action to promote equality,  the externalist  theorist  of 
rational choice would say that the agents are attempting to satisfy their preferences (their taste for 
fairness), but that the action does not involve any type of internal process or definition of what one 
is–“I am egalitarian”- together with others. The action can be explained in the instrumental manner 
the externalist wishes (Friedman, 1953; Coleman, 1990).    
            According to this methodological approach, sociological theories of identity explain little 
with many assumptions: identity neither explains social action nor is it a clear concept.  At the same 
time it is held that the internalist theory of rational choice adds needless assumptions: the externalist 
believes that the psychological realism of the internalist is unnecessary and that the formal theory of 
instrumental rationality is sufficient to explain all types of social phenomena. The external reasons – 
costs and benefits – are enough to construct hypotheses; it is not necessary to delve into the minds 
of individuals, their internal reasons for action or their identity.
 
 
3.3    Internal reasons, rational choice and identity 
 
Yet by excluding internal reasons, a wide range of social events are left unexplained and the 
externalist must deal with this limitation.  The most well-known and widely-studied case is that of 
the voter’s paradox. Why do people turn out to vote if the individual benefit to be gained from 
voting  is  negligible  compared  to  the  costs?  As  the  political  scientist  Morris  Fiorina  contends, 
“expressive factors probably dominate instrumental factors as an explanation of turnout” (1976: 
410). If we are to confront the challenge posed by identity theories without leaving the sphere of 
rational choice, we must consider how identity –the social category to which one belongs and/or the 
socially  distinguishing  feature  that  a  person  takes  special  pride  in  –  is  expressed  as  a  further 
argument of voter’s utility function. This function would be composed of instrumental elements 
(voting for the party that best represents my interests) and of non-instrumental elements that are 
expressive and identitary (voting because it is a civic duty, voting to express what one is) (Calvert, 
2002: 593). For expressive voters, “voting is a means to express political beliefs and preferences 
and, in doing so, to establish or reaffirm their own political identity” (Schuessler, 2000: 8).[6] From 
the standpoint of internalist rational choice, the explanation for social phenomena proves to be very 
weak (albeit parsimonious) if it is restricted to assuming that people act as if their reasons were only 
instrumental and selfish. Mixed models à la Margolis (1982), those which include both instrumental 
and expressive motivations, have undoubtedly done much to advance the development of rational 
choice theory by permitting the incorporation of such issues as the agent’s social identity, issues 
which were excluded from the realm of conventional, Beckerian or Olsonian models of rational 
choice.[7] However, it would be wrong to assume that these modifications never affect the theory. 
As we have already said, in the case of identity -which only the internalists seem to be interested in 
incorporating into rational choice theory- there has been a notable turnaround regarding some of the 
classic topics of rational choice: 
 
“If...voting for a candidate is  expressively motivated –which is  to  say,  the returns to  the voter are  
existential  rather than instrumental-  then there  is  no collective  action problem.  While  there  is  a public 
dimension to the instrumental efficacy of the vote (in that voters and non-voters alike partake in its electoral 
consequences), the existential consequence of voting is wholly internal. It is only the voter herself that can 
point to her electoral deed and legitimately draw her political identification from it: to be Democrat, she has 
to vote Democrat. It is not that the collective action problem has in any way been solved. It is simply that 
under expressive motivation, free-riding is no longer an appropriate analytical prism with which to view 
voting, as you cannot free-ride on expressive identification” (Schuessler, 2000: 91).
 
Rational action based on identity (being a democrat) can only be understood by relying on the 
voter’s internal reasons, who expresses what she is when she votes. We could say that Schuessler’s 
voter  creates  a  practical  syllogism “in  her  head”  whose  minor  premise  is  existential:  her  own 
identity.  The syllogism would therefore be as follows: democrats vote for the Democratic Party 
(major premise); I am a democrat (minor identitarian premise); so I vote for the Democratic Party 
(conclusion).[8] Thus the person who defines herself as a democrat has an internal reason to vote 
for the Democrats, namely, her own practical coherence. By expressing her identity through voting, 
not only does she do honor to what she is, but also to her own rationality, given the meanings she 
assigns to certain events in the world -in this case, the fact of being a democrat. 
 
In contrast, to explain voting for externalist reasons, instrumental motives are sufficient: voters 
vote for the Democrats because it benefits them. Although this is important, it  is insufficient to 
explain the voter’s paradox. People need expressive – internal – motivations to manifest what they 
are.  But when one expresses what one is, one cannot be a free-rider of oneself. This is Schuessler’s 
argument, an argument that cannot be wholly understood if we do not accept that his conception of 
rational choice is based on the existence of internal reasons (although the author does not refer to 
them as such).
 
In their proposal to construct a utility function that permits economics to account for social 
identity,  George Akerlof and Raquel Kranton do not refer to “internal reasons” either. But their 
analysis  is  an interesting essay that  transports  economic theory to  the internalist  terrain as  the 
authors propose “a utility function that incorporates identity as a motivation for behavior” (Akerlof 
and Kranton, 2000: 718, emphasis added).  Departing from the empirical evidence on the weight of 
social identity in economic and non-economic conduct, George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton were 
the first to introduce the concept of identity in an economic analysis. In Akerlof and Kranton's 
proposal, the utility of individual j is a function of j's actions, the actions of others and of identity I 
or j's self-image. On the one hand, identity is based on the social category that others attribute to a 
given person, while on the other, it is based on the “degree to which the traits εj of j coincide with 
the ideal social category that others attribute to him, which is indicated by prescription P” (Akerlof 
and Kranton, 2000: 719). Social identity therefore involves accommodating one's own image and 
thus one's own actions to that ideal. Insofar as individuals internalize the code of conduct linked to a 
prescribed behavior, feelings of anxiety and cognitive dissonance may be evoked when violating the 
prescription.  Likewise,  the  person  may  have  a  higher  sense  of  self  when  accommodating  the 
behavior prescribed by the reference group. Nonetheless, as Akerlof and Kranton point out, general 
agreement does not exist regarding social categories and prescriptions, thus providing the individual 
the option to choose her identity. 
    
What emerges from Akerlof and Kranton’s proposal is that if the internalist interpretation of 
identity is excluded from utility functions, economics in particular and rational choice theory in 
general will be unable to explain certain social phenomena.  As an example, both authors point out 
that  the  feminist  movement’s  struggle for  equal  rights  has  influenced the job market,  since by 
transforming the social notions of femininity and masculinity women have come to view working 
outside the home not only as an economic gain, but especially as a “gain in identity” (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2000: 759).[9] 
 
Needless to say, this is far removed from the methodological assumptions of Friedman and the 
externalist conception of identity and rational choice. Identity-based preferences provide reasons for 
action that can only be understood in terms of internal reasons, and therefore, by assuming a certain 
psychological realism. Staying at home not only involves external costs to women – to not earn a 
salary, to engage in certain tasks for reasons of gender, etc. - but internal costs related to what she is, 
the way she conceives of herself,  her image understood as self-understanding.  Women who are 
employed not only obtain external benefits – independence, income, relationships, etc. – but also 
internal benefits related to what it means to be a woman in her actual context.  Working outside the 
home has external compensations that could lead to a rational maximization of utilities; but it also 
resolves  a  practical  syllogism whose major  premise would be “women today work outside the 
home” and whose minor premise would once again be existential and identitary “I am a woman”.  
Here the rationality of action is measured in terms of correspondence with, or accommodation to, 
(socially)  typified  forms  of  behavior  recognized  by  the  agent.  Akerlof  and  Kranton  spoke  of 
coinciding “with the ideal social category that others attribute to him”. In short, we can say that 
identity forms part of the agent’s internal motives or reasons for action.  It would seem then, that the 
internalist approach to rational choice theory explains a larger number of social phenomena than the 
externalist interpretation. However, as we will see below, the internalist interpretation has its own 
limitations. 
 
4.      Social identity: beliefs about oneself and rational choice 
 
According to the internalist theory of rational choice, an action is rational if it is subject to a 
threefold process of optimization.  First, the action must be the best means to fulfilling the agent’s 
desires  given her  beliefs  about  the means-ends relationship.  Secondly,  beliefs  must  be optimal 
given  the  information  available  to  the  agent.  Finally,  agents  will  attempt  to  optimize  their 
information bearing in mind their previous beliefs about the cost of obtaining that information. If 
this  optimization process fails  in any way,  the relationship between beliefs  and desires  will  be 
blocked and the action will have no foundation in rationality (Elster, 1986; Hedström, 2005, 2006).  
Beliefs and desires are, as we have said, the building-blocks of the explanatory arguments of action 
based on individual rationality. 
 
The  internalist,  then,  has  two  options  for  incorporating  social  identity  into  rational  choice 
theory: by conceiving of identity either as a set of desires or as a set of beliefs.[10] Whenever 
rational  choice  has  attempted  to  include identity,  it  has  taken  the first  road.  In  this  sense it  is 
understood  that  individuals  not  only want  to  maximize  their  benefits,  but  also,  as  Schuessler 
argues,  desire to express their self, that is, to act in accordance with their social identity. Rational 
choice theory can therefore include the desire to express identity as yet another argument of the 
utility function. Voters would not only want the party that benefits them most (by cutting taxes, for 
example) to win, but would also desire to express their identity through the action of voting.  The 
formal analysis must reflect both types of desires. 
 
While  this  solution  proves  to  be  plausible  from a  formal  viewpoint  and  constitutes  a  step 
forward for rational choice theory, from a conceptual perspective loose ends remain to be tied since 
the desire to express identity is not the same as identity, which is what is expressed (just as the 
desire to drink water when one is  thirsty is not the same as thirst).  What then is  identity? As 
Akerlof and Kranton point out in a somewhat conceptually denser way, identity can be the result of 
social categorization as well as the image we have of ourselves. But what does the visual metaphor 
of “self-image” mean in this case?  The image or idea that one has of oneself can be more complex 
than the mere desire to express it, which is what identity comes down to in some models. However, 
when making their concept operational, Akerlof and Kranton tend to reduce identity to identity-
based preferences that are interiorized by the social agents, so that, once again, the very concept of 
identity is overshadowed by others. But if desires provide reasons for action based on beliefs in the 
internalist scheme of rational choice, is identity – regardless of how it is expressed – a type of 
desire? 
 
Given the nature of desires, it  proves impossible to define a person’s social  identity as that 
person’s set of desires. Although desires can be involved in shaping one’s social identity (wishing to 
be something can be a strong reason for being it/attempting to be it) they cannot define it. If desire 
is considered a reason for action (x desires  z  and, given her beliefs, does action  d to satisfy  z), 
identity cannot be understood as a desire, but rather as a source of desires.[11] Desire in itself is not 
identity; it does not define it insofar as desires have to do with how we want the world to be (Searle, 
1983: 54; 2001), while social identity has to do with how the world is; that part of the world that is 
us.  
 
While desires refer to how we want the world to be, beliefs have to do with how we believe the 
world is (whether or not we are right). We believe that the Earth is round, we do not desire it to be 
round.[12] We desire an orange juice and we believe that what is placed before us is a real orange 
and not a wax or wooden one.  We want a pay rise and we believe that going on strike is the best 
way to achieve it. The difference between the mental state we call “belief”  and the mental state we 
call “desire” lies in the direction of fit with respect to the world (Anscombe, 1957; Humberstone, 
1992): beliefs are directed at the world; they are representations about the world and they tell us 
how it is (whether it is true or not). Desires, on the other hand, indicate how the world should be for 
it to satisfy us.  Desires can be rational or irrational, but it makes no sense to say that they are true 
or false. Beliefs can be rational or irrational but also true or false. Moreover the concepts of belief 
and  truth  are  closely  related  in  both  the  case  of  implicit  and  explicit  beliefs  (Falk,  2004; 
Schwitzgebel, 2006).[13] 
 
If it is not possible to consider social identity a set of desires, it only fits into the internalist 
scheme of rational choice by considering it a set of beliefs. But what type of beliefs are they? How 
are they shaped? What relationship do they have with truth? And what relationship do they have 
with social action? If beliefs are mental representations about how the world is, identity must be 
considered a person’s set of beliefs about herself shaped by beliefs about the concrete portion of the 
world to which she belongs.  Social identity – race, gender, class, etc. – will be a person’s set of 
beliefs about herself as, for example, a black working class woman. In what follows we explore 
some  of  the  implications  of  this  eminently  epistemic conception  of  social  identity.  These 
implications are summed up in the following four theses.
 
1.      The beliefs that shape social identity are explicit, indexical and shared 
 
 
If someone says, for example, “I am Christian”, she is expressing her religious identity through 
language.  But  that  expression,  like  any  other  expression  of  identity,  encompasses  a  complex 
stockpile of beliefs about the world. No one can declare herself to be Christian without holding a set 
of beliefs about what it means to be Christian. Thus, in general, a Christian person will believe in 
the existence of God, in the resurrection of souls, in universal sins; she will believe that it is her 
duty to go to mass on Sundays or be charitable to the needy and have compassion for those who 
suffer.  She will  believe this and many more things that constitute what it  means for her to be 
Christian: “Christians- she will say- believe those things”. Identity, however, cannot be expressed 
solely through this set of beliefs. Indeed, another person may claim to share the same beliefs about 
Christians  and  not  be  Christian.  Thus,  she  must  have  a  further  belief  about  herself,  a  clearly 
indexical, self-referential belief  -  I am X- that is linked to a set of explicit beliefs about what it 
means to be X. This indexical element of self-referential belief and the explicitness of the beliefs 
about the meaning of identity are essential  if  the individual is  to construct practical  syllogisms 
through which identity becomes a motivational factor and beliefs establish a causal/intentional link 
with action. “Christians do x, y, z”; “I am Christian”;  ergo “I do x, y, z”. If beliefs were merely 
implicit, or there were no first person pronoun to assign them to, it would be difficult for identity 
(now solely a diffuse and unattached identity) to motivate action (Chai, 2001: 83; Falk, 2004: 238; 
Jervis,  2006:  642).  It  is  important  to  highlight  the  normative or  prescriptive  component  of  the 
practical identity syllogism: “I do x, y,  z” is in reality “I  should do x, y,  z”.  It  is important to 
emphasize this normative component because practical syllogisms are often not respected and the 
individual does not do what they prescribe.[14]
 
On the other hand, the set of beliefs that make sense of a particular social self – Christian, to use 
the same example – can only be a shared set of beliefs.  If every Christian who declared herself to 
be a Christian believed different things about what it means to be Christian, it would be impossible 
to speak of a religious identity. In contrast, sharing meanings is the basis of intragroup identification 
and contributes to reinforcing the beliefs that the members of the identity group have about the 
world and about themselves. The indexation of beliefs can thus move from the first person singular 
to the first person plural, that is, from the ‘I’ to the ‘we’. When this is the case, identity will be 
expressed in the form of collective action: “we, the Christians, do [should do] x, y, z”. 
 
2.      The beliefs involved in social identity are robust subjective beliefs 
 
 
One does not go to bed at night a Christian, wake up in the morning an atheist to once again 
become a Christian over afternoon tea. Social identities tend to be stable  and are not usually subject 
to unexpected or sudden changes. This is because they are based on robust beliefs:
 
“the belief is robust because it is, by the subject’s lights, evidentially extremely well supported, so well 
supported that it stands near the core of her web of belief. Such contrary evidence as comes in would be 
seen as requiring adjustments not with the belief itself, but elsewhere in the subject’s web of belief. At 
the other end of the spectrum, however, a subject’s belief might be robust because she is completely 
irrationally disposed to cling to her belief”. (Sayre-McCord and Smith, 2003: 4).[15]
 
 Robust beliefs are stable even when the individual receives new information that allows her to 
reflect  upon  them (when  beliefs  change  easily  under  the  impact  of  incoming  information  and 
reflection they are fragile). At one extreme, there are beliefs – such as the belief in the existence of 
God – that transcend the available evidence and are maximally robust. In general, we can say that 
the more robust an individual’s beliefs, the more stable her social identity.  Now, as the above text 
suggests, a robust belief is the product of all the evidence that is available to a person according to  
her own viewpoint. Social identity, therefore, is not always constructed through a rational process of 
accumulating  evidence,  that  is,  one  in  which  the  information  that  could  falsify  our  belief  is 
maximized. On occasion, even the most countervailing of facts will not cause people to renounce 
their social identity; to renounce what they believe to be.[16] The subjective point of view is crucial 
to the formation of identity beliefs. 
 
This has two far-reaching consequences. The first is that social identity is not always based on 
rational beliefs.  The second is that  the relationship between truth and belief,  as  regards social 
identity, becomes very complex given the subjectivity of the beliefs involved. On the one hand, 
subjects believe that their beliefs are true: no one can define themselves socially through a set of 
beliefs  about  themselves  and  the  world        -beliefs  shared  with  others-  and  immediately 
afterwards  add  that  these  beliefs  are  false.  Like  all  genuine  beliefs,  identity  beliefs  are  also 
influenced by the parallel metabelief in their truth –“I belief that my beliefs are true”. But on the 
other hand, these are robust beliefs that easily stand up to the evidence or for which the degree of 
evidence needed to justify them is merely subjective.        
 
The fact that identity beliefs are in turn robust and subjectively true has often led collective 
movements that are firmly linked to questions of identity (especially ethnic or religious identity) to 
possess a component of irrationality and continue to pursue their objectives in spite of repeated 
failures. The case of the so-called Basque liberation movement and the terrorist group ETA that is 
tied to the movement is revealing in this sense (Casquete, 2003 ). That the movement has survived 
as long as it has can only be explained by what some Basques believe it means to be Basque; a 
belief that is as robust as it is subjectively true. Social identities are based on socially constructed, 
shared and reinforced beliefs about the meaning of a certain social self; beliefs that do not have to 
be true, although it is essential that the social agents believe that they are.  In fact in many cases, 
identity beliefs cannot be rigorously true or false as there is no empirical basis for their essentialist 
affirmations: there is no empirical fact with regard to “being Basque” that supports the universal 
affirmation “we Basques are like this or like that”.  Yet those who hold that belief will hold it as 
being true. If the major premise of a practical syllogism is based on falsifiable beliefs, it can be 
rebutted rationally by providing new information. The subjective robustness of identity beliefs, 
however, means that the practical syllogism that leads to action cannot be refuted rationally from 
outside, and is rational from inside, internally.  Given the major premise, the agent is not irrational. 
However, this same major premise is based on non-falsifiable beliefs – its semantics is a social 
construct – and therefore cannot be refuted by the same epistemic rationality. Surely this is one of 
the reasons why identity beliefs are not transformed by means of Bayesian learning, unlike the 
beliefs  of rational choice models. The Bayesian models of learning (Breen, 1999) assume that 
people act according to their prior beliefs and that they modify these beliefs to make room for 
others (posterior beliefs) in light of the outcome of their actions.  In these models it is assumed that 
individuals  assign  a  positive  value  to  the  objective  truth  of  their  beliefs  and  the  efficient 
accumulation of evidence; two assumptions which are often alien to identity beliefs. 
 
3.               Social identity embeds a clearly emotional component 
 
 The  above discussion  does  not  exhaust  the  complexity  of  identity  beliefs.  Indeed,  another 
dimension must be added, namely that identity beliefs are “emotion-laden”. Basically what this 
means is that  beliefs are accompanied by feelings. In her brilliant studies on classic ethics and 
Aristotle in particular, Martha Nussbaum (1986, 1994) emphasized that there are certain things – 
goods – that cannot be valued properly if our feelings about them are not adequate, that is, if our 
beliefs about such goods do not provide a given emotional charge. One cannot adequately conceive 
of the (relational) good of friendship or love if one does not believe that such a friend or lover is 
irreplaceable and does not fear losing them.  Belief in the irreplaceability of the person who is the 
object of our erotic desire is essential if we are to properly value our love for  her or for him, to 
understand love itself.  If someone loves without this belief, Nussbaum would say, she does not 
know what it means to love. But, since that belief embeds the fear of loss, which is passion, the 
conclusion is that we cannot understand love if we do not feel that fear. 
 
This  line of  reasoning,  which is  currently supported by the  empirical  research  in  cognitive 
science (Damasio, 1994; Bechara and Damasio, 2005), can be extended to say that identity beliefs 
are also accompanied by feelings and emotions; although not in a contingent or casual way; but in a 
necessary and constitutive manner.[17]  Thus we cannot perceive of ourselves as being Christians or 
Basques or Muslims if we do not hold certain feelings of pride or happiness or of mistrust and 
eventual hatred towards those who are unlike us (Smith, 1999).  On the other hand, as Nussbaum 
also  points  out  in  her  interpretation and defense  of  stoic  cosmopolitanism,  there are  emotional 
benefits in the fact of belonging:  loyalties and identity ties (the more local the stronger the ties) 
provide the individual with an enormous amount of psychological security, they make a cozy nest of 
group certainties, they comfort the individual with direct recognition (Pizzorno, 1986; Nussbaum, 
1997; Hogg and Mullin, 1999). Thus, when we solve the practical syllogism of identity and act in a 
certain  way we not only gain the benefits  of internal  coherence but also laterally reinforce the 
emotional benefits of belonging.  It goes without saying that although all  of this seems to wrap 
human behavior in shadows of irrationality, it continues to be comprehensible. 
 
Rational choice theory has overlooked emotions, in spite of the role that they play in providing 
pleasure, satisfaction and utility (Elster, 1996: 1386). It should come as no surprise that little effort 
has been dedicated to the study of the ties between identity and emotion. In the formal models of 
rational choice beliefs and desires are taken as given, but emotions are not even mentioned, they 
simply do not exist. The fact that emotions have traditionally been considered irrational – and in 
this sense rational choice has been faithful to its own Humean tradition – has led to their exclusion 
from the realm of rational choice theory. Whatever the case may be, it seems clear that emotions are 
constitutive of identity beliefs. Thus, if the internalist version of rational choice theory wants to 
include the former in its models, it must also include the latter.
 
4.               Identity beliefs form complex but open structures 
 
Imagine that I say “I am X” and “being X means that I smoke a cigar at five o’clock everyday”. 
If being X only meant that,  my identity would be a simple one as it  would only motivate one 
action.  Yet social identities are not so simple. They are not so simple because they are based on 
complex  belief  structures.[18] As  we  saw  above,  being  Christian  means  very  different  but 
interconnected things. Indeed, empirical research may even be able to demonstrate the connection 
between identity belief structures, for example, that Christians tend to vote for the right in elections. 
This could be due to the fact that Christianity tends to indirectly give rise to conservative beliefs 
about social reality. To put it another way, identity belief structures can have their own epistemic 
power  and  lead  to  other  beliefs  by  establishing  connections  between  an  individual’s  different 
identities. Obviously,  this  potential coherence can be thwarted by the coexistence of conflicting 
structures.[19]
 
However, given that belief structures are sets of meanings that form a shared semantics, they are 
subject  to  revision  and  reinterpretation.  As  we  said  above,  there  is  no  closed  and  definitive 
agreement about those semantics. Consequently, this permits the individual to negotiate internally 
in order to resolve her own conflict of interests or the conflict that arises as a result of incompatible 
prescriptions (Parfit,  1984; Vescio et al.,  1999). The agent may want to fit  into the ideal social 
categories that constitute her identity, but she may lower her semantics – her demands – in order to 
satisfy other  desires  or  needs;  including that  of  belonging  to  –  and being accepted  by – other 
reference groups. She may also lower the emotional level of her identity beliefs with a view to 
maintaining other maximizing strategies or she may reinterpret her identity beliefs in order to make 
them compatible  with  other  beliefs.  For  example,  voting  for  the  left  may involve  the  explicit 
reconsideration  of  what  one  understands  by  being  Christian.  Identity  beliefs  therefore  form 
complex, but open structures.
 
5. Conclusions
 
In this paper we have rejected externalist approaches to identity and examined internalists attempts 
to incorporate identity into rational choice models. In principle, this should pose no problems given 
that accommodating identity to socially typified behavior can have a symbolic utility (it reduces or 
eliminates the cost of deviation and also provides emotional benefits) and thus be incorporated into 
an individual’s utility function -as  the preference of a person for expressing her social being.  We 
have also seen how this process is only possible from an internalist interpretation of rational choice 
theory  as  identity  involves  unavoidable  mental  processes  and  internal  reasons  that  cannot  be 
externalized. 
 
Yet it is not such a simple task to include social identity in a rational choice model.  It is not 
easy because, as we have argued, behavior motivated by identity ties and the behavior of rational 
choice models respond to  two different  rationales.  In the case of the former,  there is  a  logical 
internal coherence based on the accommodation (correspondence or coincidence) of behavior to the 
expectations prescribed by the ideal social category. In the latter case, it follows a logic of utility 
maximization given the beliefs and desires of the agent.  The problem is that the two lines of logic 
are  not  only different  but  do  not  have  to  be  cumulative  nor  compatible.  Often,  resolving  the 
practical identity syllogism involves renouncing private utility maximizations. On the other hand, 
the two rationales may become increasingly incompatible depending on the emotions involved in 
the self-categorization of identity.  Emotions cannot be taken as given as they are constitutive of 
identity beliefs and depending on their intensity they can block the maximizing motivations in the 
strict sense of the term.[20] On the other hand, we have seen how identity belief structures are open 
to revision and reinterpretation, thus permitting individuals “to negotiate” both the meanings and 
the emotional component of their identity beliefs in order to resolve their internal conflicts. 
 
But, is it possible to reflect these complexities in a broader model of rational choice? Would this 
not  involve  the  dangerous  multiplication  of  assumptions  and  lead  to  a  tremendous  loss  of 
methodological  parsimony?  While  these  questions  serve  to  express  our  reservations,  there  is 
something that is unquestionable, namely that our analysis of identity in terms of beliefs strongly 
points to the need for a linguistic analysis to gain a full understanding of human behavior (Asher, 
1986). Beliefs are mental events and practical syllogisms are (or refer to) mental processes.[21] 
However, “our sentences provide the only measure of the mental” (Davidson, 2001: 77). When we 
speak of social identities, we refer to beliefs about the social world and about ourselves insofar as 
we are members of that world. We are speaking, then, of meaning, of shared meaning, of semantics 
that are socially constructed through language. In this case, what individuals say about themselves 
appears to be a central factor that must be analyzed if we are to understand their behavior.  Identity 
beliefs are internal to the group (to the members of the group) who claim to have them. 
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[1] The philosophical debate on the internal nature of reasons for action has revolved around the 
position of Bernard Williams (1981). According to Williams, the only way to satisfy the conditions 
of truth of the proposition “X has a reason R to do A” is by appealing to what he calls the subjective 
motivational set of  agent X. Although Williams’ theory clearly has Humean roots, he diverges from 
Hume as he does not consider that only desires have motivational force. A subject’s motivational set 
includes desires, emotions, personal loyalties, projects, commitments, etc. (Williams, 1981: 105). 
[2] We lean  on  James  Fearon  (1999)  because  he  proposes  an  useful  synthetic  definition  after 
analyzing a representative set of identity definitions. (Fearon’s text is a draft. We thank the author 
for allowing us to cite it).
[3] In social psychology experiments to study if group identity explains cooperative behavior, it has been shown that 
conversations among individuals reinforce group identity- the sense of belonging to the group, of being “one of us” and 
not “one of them” – as well as promoting cooperation. Furthermore, even in experiments in which a group of strangers 
is assigned an arbitrary identity trait (for example, those who have a red symbol versus those who have a yellow one), 
this trait generates group identity (Orbel  et al. 1988).
 
[4] According to Hardin, individuals identify those who share their interests, but identification is not 
the same as identity: “If we did not have identifications, that is, commitments, it would not matter 
so  much  that  we  have  the  quasi-objective  identities  we  have  –I  as  an  Anglo-Saxon-Celtic-
Huguenot-Hillbilly-Texas-American, you as Tutsi, Serb, or whatever” (Hardin, 1995: 7). Identity 
would be none other than preferences and norms or rules of cooperation. In this same sense, and 
also from an externalist perspective, see Bicchieri (2002). 
[5] In other words, the externalist does not accept the utility of the concept of identity as either a 
category of practice (the individuals themselves refer to their identity) nor as a category of analysis 
(the social researcher assigns identities that may or may not coincide with those given by the social 
agents). For more on this distinction see Brubaker and Cooper (2000: 4). 
[6] For an in-depth review of how rational choice theory has dealt with the problem of social identity in political 
science see Calvert (2000).
[7] It is questionable whether expressive motivations are actually excluded from the classic Olsonian 
models given that such motivations represent a sort of internal selective incentive. This is a solution 
that Olson himself considered and rejected. The person who gives money to a charity organization 
states that she does so not because she believes that the money will have a large influence, but 
because she obtains “an  individual, noncollective satisfaction in the form of a feeling of personal 
moral worth, or because of a desire for respectability or praise” (Olson, 1965: 160, n. 91, italics 
Olson’s). However, by considering any decision based on selective incentives of any kind as being 
rational, the theory becomes vacant of content because  “this theory (or any theory) becomes correct 
simply by virtue of its logical consistency, and is no longer capable of empirical refutation” (ibid.).  
If  an individual always maximizes her internal or external utility no matter  what she does,  the 
theory is worthless. This is a risk that internalist models run if they reduce all motives for action to a 
mere internal utility.  
[8] For a similar argument on identity – understood as a set of roles– and on action, see James D. 
Montgomery (2000).
[9] In the first paper in which they really apply their model empirically (Akerlof and Kranton, 2002), the authors 
demonstrate that students' performance depends on their identity, that is, the social category that is attributed to them 
("crowd leaders",  "nerds" or "burnouts") and how they accommodate their  self-image to this category.  In  order to 
maximize their utility, students must not only maximize their effort, but must fit into a category. In a second study, they 
show how workers' efficiency improves when they assume the values and principles of their company (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2005).
[10] Why not both, that is, a set of desires and beliefs? As we are going to see, we reject to define 
social identity as a set of desires. 
[11] If someone desires to be a pianist, at first glance we might think that this desire defines herself, defines (part of) 
her identity. However, the desire is not understandable without a set of beliefs that backs it and truly defines the person -
her belief about her capacity to be a pianist, her belief about her capacity for working hard, and so on.Very much the 
same could be said of preferences. The fact that someone strictly prefers X to Y may be an expression of her identity, 
but would not be identity itself. 
[12] In reality one can desire anything: that the world be flat or that the sun be blue. But here we 
want to focus on desires based on well-informed beliefs and not on pure imagination or fantasy 
(although these often play a key social role. See Boudon (1994) on the social importance of false 
beliefs). 
[13] Beliefs are implicit when we do not mentally represent the contents of the proposition that 
expresses the belief (we believe, for example, that the sun will rise tomorrow, but we do not  think 
about it).   When the opposite occurs, the beliefs are explicit. 
[14] One of the most widely-studied phenomena in philosophy regarding the failure of the practical 
syllogism – from Aristotle to Davidson- is the akrasia or the weakness of will.
[15] Sayre-MacCord and Smith’s text is a draft. We thank the authors for allowing us to cite it.
[16] For this reason identity conflicts – in the case of immigrants, for example – produce obvious 
cases of anomie in the sense of Durkheim. Changing one’s country is more or less easy; changing 
one’s  identity  is  not:  the  web  of  beliefs  about  oneself  and  about  one’s  world  which  we  call 
“identity” is too closely woven to substitute it rapidly for another. In the case of fragile beliefs, 
which produce fragile identities, it is a different matter altogether.
[17] It  should come as no surprise that  the externalist  conception of rational  choice rejects  the 
explanatory  value  of  emotions:  “Explanations  of  ethnic  conflict  often  invoke  emotions. 
Unfortunately, explaining ethnic conflict as emotional may not be explaining it at all or may be 
explaining aspects of it given that it happens. The part we most need to explain is why the behavior 
happens, why such behavior is ethnically oriented” (Hardin, 1995: 56). But to explain why the 
behavior happens it is often necessary to consider the emotional aspect, although this aspect does 
not explain everything. Remember that one  component of Fearon´s definition is the feeling of pride 
that identity causes. 
[18] In which it  is inferred that not all  beliefs  about oneself  constitute an identity belief.  “I am 
dehydrated” is a belief about myself that is not an identity belief. Social identity can be conceived 
of as a complex system of beliefs about oneself and about the world, but, obviously, not all beliefs 
about oneself have to do with identity.
[19] Social identity involves complex sets of beliefs, but given that a person may have a diversity of 
social  identities,  these  sets  can  be  contradictory,  thus  creating  tension  and  uncertainty  in  the 
individual (see Aguiar and de Francisco, 2002). 
[20] This  could  translate  into  degrees  of  identification  with  the  norms  that  are  established  in 
accordance with the roles with which the individual identifies (see Montgomery, 2000: 264-266). 
Obviously,  if  the degree of identification is low, there is more room for alternative maximizing 
motivations.
[21] Aristotle  himself  viewed  the  practical  syllogism  as  a  logical  ex  post interpretation  of  a 
psychological  or  mental  process  (see  the  classic  paper  by F.C.S.  Schiller,  1917),  although  the 
process is assumed to be internal. 
